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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to provide insights into the role of governance mechanisms in
fostering innovativeness in horizontal service cooperations.
Design/methodology/approach – Data were collected from 225 horizontal service cooperations in
the logistics industry via an online survey. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze the
empirical data.
Findings – The choice of governance measures helps to improve the innovativeness of service
cooperations. The use of formalization and balanced mutual influence, combined with cultural
similarity provides the basis for the development of new or enhanced services within the cooperation.
In contexts that build on equity-based contracts, innovativeness is driven by the degree of mutual
influence among partners.
Research limitations/implications – Empirical data were collected in a single industry (logistics)
and in a single country (Germany). A confirmation of the results in different service settings is
therefore encouraged.
Practical implications – This research emphasizes the importance of governance in facilitating
innovation in service cooperations. By applying the right governance mechanisms in possible settings
of co-opetition, managers can foster coordination and the exchange of knowledge and diminish
opportunistic behavior among parties.
Originality/value – The research is extended by developing a model based on the knowledge of
service innovation, cooperation performance and governance mechanisms and by empirically testing
this model.
Keywords Co-operation, Innovation, Survey, Service operations, Organizational effectiveness,
Horizontal management
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Innovation is a major contributor to firm success in the service industry
(Calantone et al., 2002; Dilk et al., 2008; Grawe et al., 2009; Kandampully, 2002).
To respond effectively to increasing levels of competition and value chain complexity,
service companies need to devote substantial resources to process improvements and
new service development (Oke, 2007). This need is facilitated by the growing share of
outsourcing to the service sector that leads to a shift of innovation activities from focal
firms to their service providers.
One option for service providers to address this need to increase innovation
capabilities is via horizontal (intra-industry) cooperative relationships (Kale et al., 2000;
Muthusamy and White, 2006). It is not only a means for smaller service companies to
remain competitive against larger competitors due to the possibility of increasing
internal profitability and extending service portfolios (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).
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Such relationships can also stimulate innovativeness as they allow companies to
combine complementary capabilities as well as share development efforts, resulting in
services that they could not provide on their own (Sampson, 2007; Walters and
Rainbird, 2007). Past research shows that service firms already tend to use cooperative
innovation more intensely than manufacturing firms (Tether, 2005).
Stimulating innovation is challenging for a single company (Kelly and Storey, 2000),
and even more so when multiple companies are involved. First, the coordination and
alignment of strategic goals and operational processes is difficult across companies
(Ojasalo, 2008). Second, innovativeness within a cooperation relies upon the exchange of
knowledge (Calantone et al., 2002; Panayides and So, 2005) and, due to fear of
opportunistic behavior, firms may be reluctant to share their knowledge with their
partners; this reluctance can undermine innovativeness. This is especially the case for
horizontal cooperation, where, by definition, the involved firms are actual or potential
competitors, a setting often referred to as co-opetition (Dilk et al., 2008; Ritala et al., 2009).
The prevailing challenge in horizontal cooperation of service companies resides in
the fact that there are very limited methods to protect against knowledge spillover, and
as a result concerns for such spillovers become a central concern within horizontal
collaborations (Ozman, 2009). Since intellectual property rights are not applicable to
most services, service innovations can easily be imitated by competitors – especially
by companies inside the horizontal cooperation who gain thorough insights and can
expropriate firm-level know-how very quickly (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Ritala,
2010). Therefore, companies face higher risks when exchanging sensitive knowledge
within service cooperations (Ritala et al., 2009).
This dilemma of horizontal cooperation – its high innovation potential and its
management challenges – motivates the central research question of this paper:
RQ1. How can governance mechanisms be utilized to foster innovativeness in
horizontal service cooperations in order to enhance cooperation performance?
Recent research indicates that appropriate governance mechanisms foster both the
innovativeness (Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma, 2009; Sivadas and Dwyer, 2009) and the
success of cooperation (Dilk et al., 2008; Muthusamy and White, 2005; Rutten et al., 2009;
Teng and Das, 2008). However, that research has either focused on general firm
performance as the outcome variable (Schreiner et al., 2009) or did not focus on the specific
preconditions of service cooperations (Sampson, 2007). While some of these insights
certainly can be transferred to this setting, the management of service innovation within
cooperations poses additional challenges due to the specific features of services
(i.e. intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability, and perishability) (Ritala et al., 2009). The
necessity for individual research on service companies regarding the use of governance
mechanisms is also supported by Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009), who concluded that
different governance mechanisms are required for knowledge-based assets – which is the
case for most service companies – compared to property-based assets.
We extend the research by integrating concepts on service innovation, cooperation
performance, and governance mechanisms and test them empirically on a sample of
225 horizontal cooperations of service providers. They range from informal
cooperations to equity joint ventures without a specific focus on innovation per se;
rather, these arrangements were developed in order to offer, for example, joint services
or engage in cooperative marketing and sales activities.
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The objective of our research is to show how particular governance mechanisms
improve outcomes of horizontal service cooperations in terms of innovativeness and
how innovativeness improves cooperation performance. Specifically, we analyze the
effects of three operational governance mechanisms (formalization, mutual influence,
and cultural similarity) and the interplay of structural and operational governance.
This corresponds to a recent call for research to understand how to manage innovation
in cooperations (Ojasalo, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the governance mechanisms and conceptualizes how these mechanisms
influence innovation and in turn performance of the cooperation. After a short
description of the research methodology, the results are presented. Finally, we discuss
our findings and their implications and outline directions for further research.
2. Conceptual framework
This section summarizes the focal constructs and develops the conceptual framework
and the research model with its hypotheses (Figure 1). We begin by focusing on
innovation and the performance of the cooperation as an outcome and then focus
on operational and structural governance mechanisms and their interdependent roles
in fostering innovativeness.
2.1 The concepts of innovativeness and cooperation performance
Innovation has been shown to be a key driver of market performance and firm success
(Calantone et al., 2002; Dilk et al., 2008; Grawe et al., 2009; Wagner, 2008). While
literature provides multiple perspectives on innovation, we follow the notion of
“innovativeness” presented by Calantone et al. (2002). He proposes that innovativeness
consists of two parts:
(1) the willingness of the firm to be innovative; and
(2) the actual outcome (Calantone et al., 2002).
Thus, innovativeness is defined as the rate of adoption of innovation by the service
provider and its willingness to change.
Figure 1.
Conceptual model
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In literature, there is no consensus on the concept of cooperation performance. One of
the challenges of studying the performance of collaborative relationships is that
measurement is difficult because the financial effects of such activities are difficult to
observe and complex to allocate (Gulati, 1998; Saxton, 1997). Such an assessment is
made even more difficult in the context of horizontal cooperations in the service sector
due to the simultaneous production and delivery of services combined with the broad
spectrum of desired outcomes (Cruijssen et al., 2007; Glaister and Buckley, 1996). The
outcomes can include gaining access to new markets, strengthening competitive
positioning in current markets, and realizing economies of scale. As such, a good
yardstick for the performance of such relationships is the extent that these horizontal
ventures meet outcome expectations and predefined objectives (Arin˜o, 2002). We thus
apply this understanding of cooperation performance.
The performance of an organization is strongly influenced by its innovativeness. By
developing and offering new services, organizations gain competitive advantages
needed to compete in their business environment (Calantone et al., 2002; Dilk et al.,
2008; Kandampully, 2002). This in turn is built upon the ability to adapt more easily to
new economic contexts, changes in customer behavior (Hult et al., 2004), and access to
new markets with additional revenue opportunities (Grawe et al., 2009).
The positive effect of innovativeness on overall firm performance has been
empirically confirmed by Hult and Calantone who analyzed both service and
non-service settings (Calantone et al., 2002; Hult et al., 2004). The same relation can be
shown, when focusing solely on service companies, as shown by several studies:
Grawe et al. (2009) linked service innovation to market performance in the Chinese
electronics industry, Maydeu-Olivares and Lado (2003) in the European insurance
industry, and Panayides (2006) found innovativeness to lead to better performance of
logistics service providers (LSP).
While research so far has focused on individual companies or units
(e.g. strategic business units) within larger organizations, the underlying
mechanisms also apply to Settings comprised of multiple service companies, as in the
case of horizontal cooperations. We, therefore expect the same positive
relationship between innovativeness and performance of the cooperative venture, and
hypothesize:
H1. Innovativeness of a cooperation has a positive effect on the performance of
horizontal service cooperations.
2.2 Governance mechanisms
Governance plays an important role in cooperations since governance impacts multiple
domains, for example, through the design of control mechanisms and operational
processes (Teng and Das, 2008) as well as influencing the value creation of the
arrangement (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Such governance structures help:
. to coordinate cooperation activities in accordance with the predefined objectives
of the cooperation; and
. to minimize the risk of opportunism among the cooperating parties – which has
been recognized as the two most important tasks in managing such relationships
(Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009).
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Research focusing on innovation has not shown major differences between service or
manufacturing firms in the general approach to innovation or overall innovativeness
(Forsman, 2011; Vargo and Lusch, 2004). However, major differences can be identified
between these sectors concerning the role of several factors that form the basis of
innovativeness, thus implying that the role of governance mechanisms will change
when applied to horizontal collaborations amongst service providers.
First, compared to a manufacturing setting, innovation in service companies
requires a higher level of external collaboration. This need for external involvement in
service innovation is due to the key role the customer plays in a service setting. While
customer involvement with innovation is important for manufacturers to ensure value
creation (Edvardsson et al., 2005), in the service setting the customer plays a key part in
the service delivery process and is a distinct actor in the value creation process
(Gro¨nroos and Ravald, 2011). The critical role of the customer has become even more
important given the increasing level of service outsourcing (Kianto et al., 2009;
Ritala et al., 2009). In addition to such vertical collaborative activities, services firms
are increasingly forming horizontal cooperations in order to develop and offer new
services. These horizontal linkages allow service providers to share and combine
resources and capabilities to enable higher levels of innovativeness (Forsman, 2011;
Ritala et al., 2009). Service firms additional have tended to rely on higher levels of
external expertise than manufacturing firms to develop new services as many of these
firms lack the internal capabilities for innovation (Kelly and Storey, 2000) Taken
together and combined with the fact that these horizontal linkages are with potentially
competing companies, this creates a complex management scenario.
The second difference between innovation in the service versus the manufacturing
sector is the ability to protect proprietary knowledge. Knowledge is an especially vital
component of service delivery (Kianto et al., 2009; Lindsay et al., 2003). For services as
well as for products, different means exist to protect the proprietary knowledge and to
gain competitive advantage (Lane et al., 2006; Vargo and Lusch, 2004), which
determine the extent to which companies profit from the knowledge accumulated.
Manufacturing firms have the advantage of being better able to protect proprietary
knowledge by using intellectual property rights (e.g. patents). Such property rights are
often not applicable to the knowledge assets belonging to service firms (Kianto et al.,
2009; Ritala et al., 2009). In the context of horizontal cooperation amongst service
providers, the sharing and access to information is a more salient concern than in
product-oriented collaborative ventures. On the one hand, the cooperating companies
need to open up for knowledge exchange; on the other hand, in a situation of
co-opetition, they also have to protect their critical business knowledge. Since services
can be easily imitated by a competitor, companies might hold back vital information
for fear of opportunistic behavior (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Ritala, 2010; Ritala et al.,
2009; Sampson, 2007). Here, governance mechanisms improve innovativeness by
establishing the structures for coordination and by creating a trustful and positive
atmosphere (Ritala et al., 2009; Dilk et al., 2008).
The literature discusses two areas of governance that are especially salient in
horizontal service coperations:
(1) operational; and
(2) structural.
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Operational governance includes both formal and relational governance mechanisms
(Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009) and refers to the post-formation cooperation management
phase (Schreiner et al., 2009). Formal governance is characterized by general rules,
agreements, and contracts that are independent from personal relationships; relational
governance is based on the interpersonal mechanisms that are aimed at fostering trust
and social identification (Dekker, 2004; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). With respect to
innovation, both forms of operational governance are believed to facilitate
coordination and reduce opportunistic behavior in a cooperation (Hoetker and
Mellewigt, 2009).
In contrast, structural governance refers to the design-phase where the basis of the
governance structure is defined (Schreiner et al., 2009). Structural governance is
represented by the contract and ownership model and ranges from loose agreements
over minority-based contracts to joint ventures (Das and Teng, 2000; Gulati, 1998).
Thus, structural governance influences the participation modes of the cooperation
partners, the possible risks from opportunism, and the coordination requirements of
the cooperation. This leads to the conclusion that the effectiveness of operational
governance mechanisms evolves within the frame set out by structural governance.
2.3 Effects of operational governance
Within operational governance, our research focuses on three mechanisms:
(1) formalization as part of formal governance as well as;
(2) mutual influence; and
(3) cultural similarity as part of relational governance, which – as outlined below –
have already been shown to be highly relevant in cooperations.
Formalization, opposed to structural governance, covers the activities and processes of
the cooperation on an operational level by “detailed tasks, activities, schedules and
operating procedures for the alliance” (Murray and Kotabe, 2005, p. 1527). Thus,
formalization influences the day-to-day interaction among the cooperation
partners. Corresponding formal measures such as setting of goals, responsibilities,
and tasks have, in the interview-based study of Dilk et al. (2008), been identified as
success factors for innovation networks. Formalization helps partners both to achieve
better coordination and to counteract opportunistic behavior (Hoetker and Mellewigt,
2009), thus serving as a basis for innovative activities.
Formalization has been identified by Galbraith (1973) as an important coordination
mechanism that increases information-processing capacity and thus improves the
ability to handle large amounts of information. The argument is mirrored by Murray
and Kotabe (2005) who consider formalization as an important method to increase
cooperation efficiency without hampering the knowledge exchange necessary for
innovation as well as Mollenkopf et al. (2000) who show that formalization supports
coordination and information dissemination in organizations.
In addition, formalization is also an effective way to reduce opportunistic behavior
among the cooperating parties. As it sets clear limitations to the cooperation activities
of each party, the possibility for one party to gain at the expense of others is restricted
(Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). Moreover, formalization ensures that each party will
consider the explicit consequences of violating defined standards (Lee and Cavusgil,
2006). This deters exploitation and helps to increase mutual confidence and trust
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in the exchange relationship by limiting the risk and environmental uncertainty
associated with the cooperation and its outcome (Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma, 2009;
Dekker, 2004). Together with the reduced risk of opportunism, it has a strong positive
effect on innovativeness (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Ritala, 2010; Ritala et al., 2009).
Thus, formalization encourages both parties to exchange sensitive information
necessary for innovation and engage in common innovative activities (Bosch-Sijtsema
and Postma, 2009; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Ritala, 2010).
In addition to facilitating coordination and reducing opportunism, formalization has
a direct effect on innovativeness by fostering innovative potential at the start of the
cooperation. When analyzing and defining common processes, the cooperating parties
gain insights into each other’s working modes and procedures and in that way gain
knowledge and awareness regarding good and best practices, potential areas of
improvement, and capabilities necessary for enhanced processes and services. Based
on the above argument, we hypothesize:
H2. Formalization has a positive effect on service cooperation innovativeness.
Relational governance is based on trust building and enhanced partner selection
mechanisms (Dekker, 2004). Like formal governance, it improves coordination and
reduces opportunism (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). While trust can neither be forced
nor controlled directly, it can be fostered by mechanisms that build the required
confidence, as is the case with mutual decision making or common norms (Dekker,
2004; Zucker, 1986; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). Consequently, we view two distinct
relational governance mechanisms in this research: mutual influence and cultural
similarity of cooperating parties. These mechanisms have been shown as relevant
antecedents of innovativeness and cooperation performance in recent empirical studies
of vertical buyer-supplier cooperations (Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma, 2009; Linnarsson
and Werr, 2004; Muthusamy and White, 2006).
Mutual influence has been identified as an important governance component by
several scholars (Gundlach et al., 1995; Muthusamy and White, 2005) as it describes
how symmetrically or well-balanced the cooperation is organized when it comes to key
decisions and major transactions. By allowing all parties to influence decisions about
cooperation to the same degree, open communication, conflict resolution, and joint
decision making are facilitated and encouraged which results in direct discussion of
individual concerns or problems, better coordination, and increased effectiveness
(Galbraith, 1973; Muthusamy and White, 2006; Li and Choi, 2009).
Reducing opportunism through mutual influence is also essential for
innovativeness. A balance of power in the cooperation promotes an atmosphere of
forbearance, mutual respect, and reciprocity that helps to compensate for the risks of
opportunism. It creates trust and confidence (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009;
Muthusamy and White, 2005; Steensma and Lyles, 2000) and increases the
willingness to cooperate and exchange information. This translates into a greater
potential for joint learning and innovation (Muthusamy and White, 2005). The
corresponding empirical observation has also been made by Fyrberg and Ju¨riado
(2009) who emphasize that innovation potential is reduced when one partner dominates
the cooperation. Simply put, balanced influence is a key enabler of learning and
knowledge transfer (Muthusamy and White, 2005) and can thus enhance
innovativeness (Hurley and Hult, 1998; Shang et al., 2009). This will especially be
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the case in rather complex and challenging settings as in horizontal service
cooperations. Consequently, we posit:
H3. Mutual influence has a positive effect on service cooperation innovativeness.
Cultural similarity is expressed by shared norms and a common management style
among cooperation partners. Sharing a “language” and understanding helps
coordination since compatibility among partners facilitates decision making and
communication in general (Kale et al., 2000; Ritala et al., 2009). A common culture
among the cooperating parties is a relevant antecedent for innovative activities in
cooperations (Kale et al., 2000) as it ensures open exchange and strengthens the
willingness to transfer knowledge for the sake of joint innovation activities (Sivadas
and Dwyer, 2009). When cooperation partners have the same cultural background, they
have a shared understanding of frameworks, schemes, and meanings; this prevents
information loss when exchanging knowledge in interpersonal communication (Grant,
1996). White (2005) also supports this view as he accounts cultural distance for the
additional costs necessary to facilitate coordination among cooperation partners as a
result of training or administrative and process changes.
Beside the greater ease of coordination, cultural similarity also reduces the fear of
opportunistic behavior (Schreiner et al., 2009). As cooperation is built on personal and
social interaction, a compatible corporate culture and shared norms will enhance trust
between the cooperation partners (Tubin and Levin-Rozalis, 2008; Zucker, 1986). Thus,
cultural similarity strongly motivates partners to open up within their cooperation
towards exchanging knowledge among potentially competing parties. Consequently,
cultural similarity strengthens the basis for innovativeness (Ritala et al., 2009). This
effect is confirmed by Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma (2009), who studied the governance
mechanisms used in the construction industry, and by Dilk et al. (2008), who emphasized
“soft and cultural factors” – in addition to relevant expertise and technical knowledge –
in order to build an innovative cooperation. The above argumentation leads us to
hypothesize:
H4. Cultural similarity has a positive effect on service cooperation innovativeness.
As cooperative relationships are embedded in a broader network of social relationships
(Granovetter, 1985; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), it is agreed that they cannot be governed
solely by formal provisions, but also require relational governance (Larson, 1992; Zaheer
and Venkatraman, 1995). However, the role of relational governance is especially strong
in service settings. This is indicated in the academic literature. For example, Kianto et al.
(2009), viewing different forms of intellectual capital and its protection in service and
manufacturing firms, concluded that relational factors are of higher importance in
service companies. Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009), found that relational governance is
particularly valuable when knowledge plays a key role in cooperation, which is more
pronounced in service cooperations. A similar theme is echoed in the work of Ritala et al.
(2009) who document that informal inter-personal and inter-firm relationships determine
the success of horizontal service cooperations. Consequently, we posit that different
from product-related cooperations, the relevance of relational governance in horizontal
service cooperations is greater than that of formal governance:
H5. The positive effects of relational governance on service cooperation
innovativeness are stronger than the positive effect of formal governance.
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2.4 Effects of structural governance
Structural governance mechanisms are the second pillar of cooperation governance and
refer to the general contractual setup of the cooperation as specified ex ante. A common
differentiation is between equity- and non-equity-based relationships (Murray and
Kotabe, 2005). While the latter include both verbal and written contracts, the former
includes different degrees of equity shares with respect to resources or legal entities and
consequently is more formalized. Equity shares can either be a direct equity
participation – typically a minority equity participation representing no more than
20 percent of the target firm’s equity (Pisano, 1989) – or a joint venture with balanced
equity shares. The latter often involve separate legal entities and are based on clear
hierarchical structures defining the influence of the individual partners (Dilk et al., 2008).
In contrast to operational governance mechanisms, the choice of structural
governance takes place during the initiation phase of a cooperation (Schreiner et al.,
2009). Several scholars have shown that the success of cooperations depends on the
design of governance relevant for the specific environment (Lee and Cavusgil, 2006;
Ouchi, 1979; Yin and Zajac, 2004). This means that structural governance presets the
context of the cooperation (Teng and Das, 2008) and therefore influences the effect of
all other actions or measures during the operations of the cooperation. This includes
the effects of operational governance in the cooperation, where two main effects can be
derived. First, structural governance reduces the extent of ex post coordination
requirements; second, it reduces the risks that are associated with the opportunistic
behavior.
Equity-based cooperations tend to have dedicated management functions (especially
when organized as separate legal entity). This ex ante coordination makes later
interaction and coordination within the cooperation easier (Sampson, 2007). Even
though not all areas of cooperation activities might have been defined upfront, the
incorporated mechanisms help to overcome challenges and differences on short notice
(Kok and Creemers, 2008; Pisano, 1989). The initial setup of an ownership structure goes
along with an upfront alignment of partner interests and a distinct predefinition of the
allocation of benefits and the required contribution of partners (Gulati, 1995). By doing
so, the additional ex post coordination needs and the risk concerning hidden agendas
when later exchanging tacit know-how are reduced (Pisano, 1989).
Establishing an equity-based cooperation not only facilitates coordination by
establishing a formal ownership model but also reduces the risk associated with any
later opportunistic behavior. Ownership models imply significant investments in
cooperation-related assets that might be at risk when opportunism occurs. Thus,
exchange parties are highly interested in setting up deterrents such as “contingent
claims contracts including nonperformance penalties, auditing provisions, lawsuit
provisions, etc.” (Deeds and Hill, 1999, p. 143). Moreover, ownership models engender
“mutual hostage” situations that automatically reduce the partners’ incentives to
behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1975).
Thus, based on these two effects, we posit that within equity cooperations the effect
of all operational governance mechanisms on cooperation innovativeness will be
weaker than in non-equity-based cooperations. Consequently, it is hypothesized:
H6a. In equity-based cooperations formalization has a weaker influence on
cooperation innovativeness than in non-equity-based cooperations.
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H6b. In equity-based cooperations mutual influence has a weaker influence on
cooperation innovativeness than in non-equity-based cooperations.
H6c. In equity-based cooperations, cultural similarity has a weaker influence on
cooperation innovativeness than in non-equity-based cooperations.
3. Research methodology
3.1 Research design and sample characteristics
In order to test the derived hypotheses, we decided to collect primary data from service
companies via a key informant approach (Phillips and Bagozzi, 1986). In order to
analyze the effects of governance mechanisms on innovativeness in horizontal service
cooperations, we targeted senior managers of service companies that were potentially
engaged in cooperations with other service providers. For comparability reasons, we
decided to focus on only one service industry and chose third party logistics service.
The logistics service industry seems appropriate for two main reasons: first, the
logistics sector is one of the most important service industries and accounts for
5 percent of the GDP in Germany (Destatis, 2010). Second, as current research reveals,
horizontal service cooperations are important to this industry as more and more LSP
cooperate with other LSPs. Additionally, knowledge protection is of great relevance in
this highly competitive industry.
The sample was derived from a commercial database (Hoppenstedt database)
containing corporate information on firms with legal entities in Germany and an
annual turnover of more than e1 million (approx. US$ 1.3 million). We retrieved valid
email addresses of the top managers for 3,686 logistics companies.
These managers received an email-invitation with a personalized link to our
web-based survey. To ensure face validity, the survey was pretested with five logistics
researchers and nine CEOs of LSPs. In total, 426 responses were received, a response
rate of 11.6 percent. The respondents have an average professional experience within
their company of more than 16 years and are hold senior management positions
(53 percent of the respondents were executive managers, all others also hold leading
management positions).
The questionnaires were checked for incomplete data, leaving 399 remaining
responses. Of these, 225 responses originate from logistics service companies that are
currently involved in a horizontal cooperation with other LSP. This share is typical for
the logistics service industry, where between 50 and 60 percent of companies are
engaged in horizontal cooperation. The responding companies cover the spectrum of
small, medium, and large enterprises (Table I). The cooperations include both bi- and
multi-lateral setups and are not focused on innovation per se, but instead were focused
on operational goals such an joint service production, joint marketing and sales, and
joint purchasing (Table II).
We tested for non-response bias by first comparing company demographics of the
responding firms to those of the non-responding ones employing available data from
the company database. Second, we compared responses for the early and late
respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Third, we conducted a follow-up study
with 250 randomly selected companies from our sample of non-respondents, leading to
a response rate of 78 percent. We compared company demographics and response
patterns from the follow-up participants to those of the primary participants.
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All three tests suggest that non-response bias is not a concern since all t-tests were
non-significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
To address concerns of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003) we first
conducted Harman’s single factor test and then applied the marker variable procedure
with a variable which is theoretically uncorrelated to at least one variable of our
conceptual model (Podsakoff et al., 2003). For this purpose, we used the measurement
of “the possibility to access financial resources by cooperating” as marker variable. We
found the lowest correlation of the marker variable to the items of the focal constructs
to be 0.001 ( p . 0.983) which represents the upper bound for a potential common
method variance. The results of both tests indicate that common method bias is not of
relevance in this study.
3.2 Measurement scales
To operationalize the constructs included in our conceptual model, we used established
measurement scales relying upon multi-item Likert-type scales. They are presented in
the Appendix and described in the following.
Cooperation Innovativeness was measured based on the scale developed by
Calantone et al. (2002) which determines the willingness of the cooperation to be
innovative and the actual outcome. Cooperation performance was measured with the
established performance scale of Saxton (1997). It identifies whether the partnership
has achieved its goals, has enhanced core competencies and competitive advantages,
Sales revenue (in e) n %
1-5 million 38 16.9
.5-25 million 89 39.6
.25-100 million 48 21.3
.100-500 million 30 13.3
.500 million-5 billion 15 6.7
.5 billion 5 2.2
Total 225 100.0
Table I.
Company demographics
of respondents
n %
Number of cooperation partners
2 69 30.8
.2 155 69.2
Total 224 100.0
Field(s) of cooperation (functional areas that account for more than 25 percent of cooperation content)
Service delivery 125 55.6
Marketing 99 44.0
Purchasing 36 16.0
HR 15 6.7
IT 8 3.6
R&D 4 1.8
Finance 4 1.8
Table II.
Cooperation
demographics
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and whether the focal cooperation partner is satisfied with the performance and the
degree to which expectations have been met.
Formalization of the cooperation was measured based on a scale of Murray and
Kotabe (2005) asking for standard operating procedures as well as for the existence of
written documents that detail tasks, activities, and schedules. Mutual influence was
captured via a scale developed by Muthusamy and White (2006) that determines
whether cooperation partners have an equal say concerning cooperation transactions
and an equal influence on each other. Cultural similarity was measured based on
Kale et al. (2000) assessing the symmetry of the management and operating styles and
their organizational cultures.
Structural governance was measured through a categorical variable with four
categories that distinguish cooperations with:
(1) verbal contracts;
(2) written contracts without equity involvement;
(3) minority equity-base; and
(4) joint ventures, which corresponds to the four types of cooperation discussed in
the literature (Frankel et al., 1996; Teng and Das, 2008).
For the assessment of scale reliability and validity, we used SPSS 18.0 and Amos
18.0. The correlation matrix for all measurement indicators is displayed in the
Appendix. For all scales the Cronbach’s a values (the Appendix) exceed the suggest
level of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). We further conducted a confirmatory factor analysis
(Anderson et al., 1987). After eliminating one item from the innovativeness scale due to
low indicator reliability, the model exhibited good fit: x 2/df ¼ 1.970, CFI ¼ 0.955,
TLI ¼ 0.937, RMSEA ¼ 0.066, and SRMR ¼ 0.041. All factor loadings were
significant (at p , 0.001), supporting convergent validity for the constructs
(Bagozzi et al., 1991). For each construct the composite reliability ranges from 0.73
to 0.85, which exceeds the required threshold of 0.6 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).
Discriminant validity was assessed following Fornell and Larcker (1981). We assessed
discriminant validity by comparing the average variance extracted (AVE) of each
construct with each construct’s squared correlations with all other constructs; in all
cases AVE exceeded the largest squared correlation between constructs,
demonstrating discriminant validity. Additionally, the AVE for all constructs
exceeds 0.50, demonstrating convergent validity.
3.3 Hypotheses test results – base model
In the first step, we calculated the structural base model that relates to the relationships
among the three governance constructs (formalization, mutual influence, and cultural
similarity), innovativeness and cooperation performance as hypothesized in H1-H5.
Structural equation modeling was used to assess the proposed model and showed good
model fit: x 2/df ¼ 1.967, CFI ¼ 0.953, TLI ¼ 0.937, RMSEA ¼ 0.066, and
SRMR ¼ 0.050. Further, we included several control variables in the model: size of
the network, regional coverage, focal firm size, duration of cooperation. None of the
control variables were significant in the structural model.
H2-H5 examine the influence of the three governance mechanisms on the
innovativeness of the cooperation, presuming positive relationships. The model results
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indicate significant positive effects for all three paths as shown in Figure 2.
The standardized path coefficients are 0.353 ( p , 0.001) for formalization,
0.376 ( p , 0.001) for mutual influence, and 0.193 ( p , 0.05) for cultural similarity.
This supports the H2-H4. Further, the combined effect size of relational governance
(0.376 þ 0.193 ¼ 0.569) is substantially stronger than the effect of formal governance
(0.353), which supports H5. The relationship between innovation and performance was
likewise found to be significantly positive (0.463; p , 0.001), which provides support
for H1.
Moreover, the model reveals high explanatory power. The variance explained (R 2)
for innovativeness is 32.8 percent and for cooperation performance 21.4 percent. When
considering that governance is only one of many aspects within a cooperation that
influences innovativeness (others being, for example, knowledge, absorptive capacity,
and cooperation strategy), these results signify that a substantial part of cooperation
outcome relates to governance and specifically to the usage of formal and relational
governance mechanisms.
3.4 Hypotheses test results – moderation
As mentioned above, we also analyzed the moderating effect that resides in
equity-based cooperation set-ups. For this purpose, we conducted multi-group analysis
and x 2-difference tests. The overall model fit improved when separating the sample
along the dimensions non-equity versus equity-based cooperations yielding the
standardized path coefficients presented in Table III.
The analysis shows that the effect of formalization on innovativeness of a
cooperation is substantially smaller for cooperations based on equity arrangements
(0.110 instead of 0.397). The difference is significant and consistent with H6a. For the
two dimensions of relational governance, the results are somewhat different. The effect
of mutual influence on innovativeness actually increases significantly for settings with
equity involvement. This is contrary to our initial assumptions and, thus, H6b has to
be rejected. For the second measure of relational governance, cultural similarity, our
analysis shows a significant effect on innovativeness only in non-equity-based settings
and a non-significant effect for equity-based cooperations. The corresponding decrease
of the path coefficient from 0.225 to 0.077 is consistent with our hypothesis. However,
the x 2-difference test indicates that this substantial difference is not significant. We
therefore only conclude weak support for H6c.
Figure 2.
Empirical results for the
structural base modelNote: Significant at: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.01 and ***p-value < 0.001
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Revisiting H5, the moderation model highlights that relational governance is of higher
relevance – due to its stronger combined path coefficients both for equity-based and
for non-equity-based cooperations – than formal governance independent of the
structural governance set-up.
4. Discussion
4.1 Results interpretation
First, our research demonstrates that the positive relationship between innovativeness
and overall performance that so far has just been shown at the level of an individual
firm (Calantone et al., 2002; Grawe et al., 2009; Hult et al., 2004) also applies to the
multi-company setting of horizontal service cooperations as a cooperation’s overall
performance is substantially driven by its innovativeness. While many researchers
have studied cooperations focused on innovation (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Oxley
and Sampson, 2004), where this relationship is almost self-evident, our research was
focused on cooperations that are not specifically directed towards innovation, but focus
on other areas such as joint service provision, joint marketing and sales, and joint
purchasing. Nevertheless, the long-term market success of these service cooperations is
highly dependent on the ability of cooperation partners to foster the innovativeness of
their partnership in terms of improving operations, or developing new products or
services (Ritala et al., 2009).
While innovativeness is indispensable, service companies are still faced with the
challenge to simultaneously share information, which provides the fundamental basis
for innovativeness, and protect strategic knowledge. The difficulty to engage in such
knowledge exchange in settings where the cooperating parties are (potential)
competitors has been discussed in the literature before (Kale et al., 2000; Ritala et al.,
2009; Teng and Das, 2008).
In this context, our research shows that different forms of governance play a key
role in fostering innovativeness as the operational governance mechanisms explain
almost 1/3 of the differences in innovativeness (R 2 ¼ 32.8 percent). Both formal and
relational governance help to promote coordination and mitigate opportunism among
cooperation partners to create the setting necessary for innovation. While the findings
are consistent with the exploratory case study analysis of Ritala et al. (2009), we provide
Non-equity-
based
cooperations
(n ¼ 139)
Equity based
cooperations
(n ¼ 86)
p-level of
significance in x 2-
differences of path
coefficients
Hypothesis
regarding
moderation
Formalization! innovativeness
(H6a) 0.397 * * * 0.110 (ns) 0.006 Support
Mutual
influence! innovativeness
(H6b) 0.280 * 0.602 * * * 0.025 No support
Cultural
similarity! innovativeness
(H6c) 0.225 * 0.077 (ns) 0.395
Weak
support
Notes: Significant at: *p , 0.05, * *p , 0.01, * * *p , 0.001; ns – not significant
Table III.
Results of moderation
analysis
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insights on the different roles of formal and relational governance mechanisms and we
introduced the interdependence of operational and structural governance to the
discussion of horizontal service cooperation. Although both types of operational
governance – formal and relational governance – do influence cooperation
innovativeness, we were able to confirm the proposed predominant role of relational
governance in service cooperations. This is a differentiating aspect between the service
and manufacturing sectors, in the sense that formal governance is assumed to be of
higher importance in cooperations of product companies.
Further, our results provide empirical evidence that the contractual setup serves as
a structural governance framework in which the operational governance mechanisms
are effective. While at a much more general level, prior research had indicated that the
effect of operational governance mechanisms depends on the structural setting
(Murray and Kotabe, 2005), we were able to show the actual interrelationship in service
cooperations and with respect to innovation in such cooperations.
In non-equity-based cooperations, where the coordination needs and the risks
resulting from potential opportunism are much larger, operational formalization plays
an important role for innovativeness. In contrast, operational formalization is not
effective in equity-based cooperations. Here the formalization at the structural
governance level is sufficient to reduce coordination needs and risks of opportunism. In
that way, it already provides a sound basis for innovativeness. Consequently, additional
formalization on the operational day-to-day level has only a very limited
(non-significant) effect for innovativeness.
The effects for cultural similarity as a relational governance mechanism are quite
similar to operational formalization. While the effect sizes are a little smaller (between
1/2 and 3/4 of the effects of formalization) the general pattern is the same. Cultural
similarity has a significant positive influence on innovativeness in non-equity
cooperations, whereas its effect weakens and becomes non-significant for equity-based
cooperations. In the standard setting without equity involvement (62 percent of the
analyzed cooperations rely on oral agreements or written contracts without equity
involvement), cultural similarity between the parties is important. A common
understanding of management styles, norms, and cultures lays the foundation for
mutual trust and enables a “common language” in the cooperation. The fact that the
influence decreases for equity-based cooperations is in line with the findings for formal
governance. When either a new legal entity is founded ( joint venture) or very close ties
are formed through joint equity shares, cultural similarity only has a very marginal
effect on innovativeness as the risks of opportunism are already reduced via structural
governance.
While formal governance and cultural similarity could not add significant value to
the cooperation innovativeness for equity-based cooperations, mutual influence does.
In fact, in equity-based cooperations, mutual influence becomes the dominant factor
determining innovativeness of the cooperation. Contrary to our initial hypotheses, the
effect of mutual influence, a relational governance mechanism, is not decreasing when
the cooperation is based on equity. Apparently, companies that invest in cooperation
may be cautious to avoid knowledge spillover to their partner(s), at least to the degree
that this spillover is smaller than the profit they realize from the cooperation
themselves. As indicated by Steensma and Lyles (2000), the success of equity
cooperations (in their case, joint ventures) depends on balanced management control;
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otherwise the smaller, less powerful firms will use all means to protect themselves
(Linnarsson and Werr, 2004; Pisano, 1989; Scherling and Wang, 1997), which will
hamper innovation.
4.2 Managerial implications
The findings of this research are relevant for managers in service industries dealing with
horizontal cooperations. As many cooperations do not originate from an innovative idea,
but rather aim to reduce costs, gain efficiency, or serve a greater customer base (Ozman,
2009), the relevance of innovation might not be at the top of the managers’ minds. The
strong impact of cooperation innovativeness on cooperation performance, however,
reveals that managers should pay attention to the aspect of innovation from the
beginning of the cooperation. When initiating a new horizontal cooperation, managers
should no longer focus on how to protect their knowledge and their customers from their
competitor(s) by impeding information flows. By reflecting on and using appropriate
governance mechanisms, service companies can improve coordination and reduce risks
of opportunism. Such an approach supports the innovativeness of the cooperation and
allows the partners to reap the full benefit of cooperation.
Although the implementation of formalized processes in practice seems
counterintuitive to the creativity needed to foster innovativeness (Ojasalo, 2008), our
research reveals that without the positive effects of formalization (improved
coordination and reduced risks of opportunism), innovation within a cooperation is
harder to achieve. In this respect, the level of operational formalization appears to be
lower in non-equity than in equity-based cooperations, although its effect is much
stronger in non-equity-based cooperations. Consequently, managers of
non-equity-based cooperations may want to reconsider formalization as a means to
enhance the value of the cooperation through innovation.
Managers dealing with equity-based cooperations should put a stronger emphasis
on establishing a set-up of balanced mutual influence to benefit most from the
cooperation. This means, especially for more powerful partners, that they have to
reduce their influence to a balanced level in the cooperation. Otherwise they hinder
information flows from less influential companies, which might fear opportunistic
behavior by the lager partner, and leave innovation potential unused.
5. Limitations and further research
Certain limitations of the study should be kept in mind when interpreting the results
and initiating future research. Our empirical research is static in the sense that we do
not focus on cooperation development over time. As past research indicates that
cooperation performance and choice of cooperation partners is dependent on prior
cooperation experience and history of the individual companies (Gulati, 1998), future
research may want to take cooperation history into account when studying the effects
of governance mechanisms.
Further, this research supports the fact that the exchange of knowledge among
firms is crucial for innovativeness. We therefore encourage future research on the role
of specific types and sources of knowledge for innovation. This includes viewing how
companies absorb the relevant knowledge (here absorptive capacity will be of vital
importance) and how they transfer it to the relevant people within the company and the
cooperation.
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This empirical research utilized data from the logistics service industry collected in
one country. A cross-industry comparison in the service sector in a specific industry
where:
. there exists less knowledge about managing horizontal collaborative
relationships; or
. such relationships are explicitly formed to improve innovation would provide
valuable knowledge.
Replicating this study in other countries or regions would further help to improve the
generalizability of these findings.
We limited this research to selected governance mechanisms – formalization,
mutual influence, and cultural similarity – that together explain a great part of
innovativeness in cooperations. However, other mechanisms like explicit management
tools (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009), personal ties (Kale et al., 2000), solidarity
(Gundlach et al., 1995), or the form of information exchange (Jap and Ganesan, 2000)
are likewise important. Thus, we recommend that scholars conduct holistic research
that integrates, analyzes and prioritizes the variety of governance modes that are
discussed in the literature in terms of their ability to foster both innovativeness and
performance of a cooperation.
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Appendix
Measurement
scales Mean SD
Formalization (Murray and Kotabe, 2005), Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.73, AVE ¼ 0.58
Form 1 In our cooperation we have written documents (e.g. handbooks) that
spell out tasks, activities and procedures for the cooperation with a high
level of detail
4.71 1.981
From 2 In our cooperation we use very detailed standard operating procedures
(e.g. rules, policies, forms) for the processes of the cooperation
5.17 1.730
Mutual influence (Muthusamy and White, 2006), Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.73, AVE ¼ 0.59
Mut 1 Each cooperation partner has an equal say in all cooperation
transactions
4.61 2.115
Mut 2 Each cooperation partner can influence the other in making decisions
related to the cooperation
5.17 1.748
Cultural similarity (Kale et al., 2000), Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.85, AVE ¼ 0.75
Cult 1 In comparison to our cooperation partner, we have an identical
operational management style
3.39 1.663
Cult 2 In comparison to our cooperation partner, we have identical
organizational cultures
3.56 1.771
Cooperation innovativeness (Calantone, 2002), Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.85, AVE ¼ 0.59
Inno 1 Together with our cooperation partner(s), we frequently try out new
ideas
4.08 1.519
Inno 2 Together with our cooperation partner(s), we seek out new ways of
doing things
4.24 1.644
Inno 3 Together with our cooperation partner(s), we are creative in our
methods of operation
4.90 1.477
Inno 4 Together with our cooperation partner(s), we bring more innovative
services to the marked as our competitors
4.65 1.545
Inno 5 Together with our cooperation partner(s), we are often the first to
market with new services (eliminated in scale refinement process)
n.a. n.a.
Cooperation performance (Saxton, 1997), Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.84, AVE ¼ 0.64
Perf 1 Overall, we are very satisfied with the performance of this cooperation 5.44 1.190
Perf 2 The alliance has contributed to our core competencies and competitive
advantage
5.64 1.206
Perf 3 The cooperation has realized the goals we set out to achieve 5.27 1.330
Note: All items are measured on a seven-point Likert-scale where 1 ¼ strongly disagree and 7 ¼
strongly agreeTable AI.
Cooperation contract n ¼ 225
Which type of cooperation contract do you have?
Non-equity-based (oral contract, written contract
without equity involvement) 139
Equity-based (equity-based contract, joint venture
contract)
86
Table AII.
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